principally between the NSA recipient and the CES. It is also envisaged, apparently, that no one will be granted the NSA unless they have entered into such a "contract". From a legal point of view, these "contracts" raise several questions. Is it intended that they will carry the usual incidents of full legal enforceability, as with ordinary contracts? For example, if a NSA recipient did not adhere to his/her personalised program of work search and/or re-training as laid down in the "contract", presumably the Commonwealth could exercise its right to end or at least suspend further NSA payments. Could the Commonwealth go further and sue the defaulting recipient for damages for breach of contract? If so, what would be the measure of damages? Damages might possibly consist of those NSA payments received by the defaulter during the period of his/her breach of the "contract". On the other hand, if the Commonwealth cut off NSA payments, wrongly alleging that the recipient was breaching his/her obligations under the "contract", could the recipient sue the Commonwealth for damages for breach of contract? From a (perhaps) more practical point of view, would these "contracts" (or decisions made pursuant to them) be reviewable for One thing about these proposed "contracts" is quite clear. They are intended to underscore and emphasise very strongly the fact that NSA recipients are not just passive receivers of social security benefits: they (the NSA recipients) will be expected -and compelled -to actively seek reintegration into the work force at the earliest possible opportunity. If a person receives the NSA for 2 years, an extensive and intensive review of that person's status will occur. It is apparently planned that, after 2 years on the NSA, a recipient's case will be jointly reviewed by the CES and the DSS. The object of this procedure will be to determine the recipient's situation, where he/she should remain on the NSA, or, if unable to work, whether he/she should transfer to some other program of income support. Persons who are receiving the NSA on a long term basis, and who are aged between 18-54, will receive expanded access to Commonwealth funded work training programs such as "Jobstart", "Jobtrain", "Skillshare" and "Job Clubs" -provided that recipients have been assessed by the DSS and the CES as being suitable for these programs.
Many of the "nuts and bolts" aspects of the proposed JSA/NSA system will remain relatively unchanged from the existing system of unemployment benefits. Thus, there is no proposal to change the current rates of payment. The differences between the "married" and "single" rates will remain. The special rates for those with dependent children will continue. Waiting periods for benefits will remain in place. It will continue to be necessary to register for work with the CES. Recipients will also still need to present a tax file number, in order to receive payments. Employer separation certificates will be retained, as will the current procedure of fortnightly lodgment of claims with the DSS. Also, as explained above, the requirements for active work search will not only be retained under the new arrangements, but will be significantly expanded. The Commonwealth intends that all those covered by the existing scheme of unemployment benefits at the time of implementing the new arrangements, will be transferred to the new system. Transferees will then come under the obligations of the JSA/NSA scheme, as well as taking part in its "assistance" aspects. It seems quite clear that current benefit receivers will have no choice about whether or not they transfer to the new structure. It will be compulsory.
The following remarks can be made, by way of final comments. First, one cannot say that unemployment benefits, as such, have been abolished. They remain in being, but under new names. Second, the requirements for benefit receivers to actively engage in job searching and, where appropriate, work training, have been noticeably toughened up. Third, the introduction of "contracts" between recipients and the federal government, outlining the former's responsibilities under the new system, is a novel and interesting way of reinforcing obligations of those receiving benefits. Fourth, the overall design of the new scheme shows that the Federal government intends that recipients will no longer be merely passive receivers of social security (if that was ever a correct description of their situation). They must now take an enhanced role in planning their return to the work force as soon as possible.
(This update has been based on material provided by the Federal Department of Social Security. It is current as at August/September 1990. The writer would like to thank the Department of Social Security for their prompt and willing assistance in providing relevant material.)
